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Co-development in Mali

A Case Study of a Development Phenomenon Exploited by Immigration Policy

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Abstract

This case study establishes a historical basis for migration from Kayes, contextualizes co-development in immigration and development literature, and provides insight into how organizations implementing migrant financed projects in Mali define and perceive the concept of co-development. In my research, I pulled together scholarly articles, organizational documents, reports, and conducted semi-structured personal interviews that were scattered across the fields of history, migration, and development and pulled together an analysis of co-development in Mali. Challenging the concept of co-development as an effective immigration policy and a development strategy, this paper reflects the concept's true benefits to Malian society. Finally, the conclusion is drawn that while co-development in Mali fits many credentials of sustainability, it is not a *strategy*, but rather a phenomenon of development. However, the unique role of migrants in Kayes (and the broader Senegal River Valley region) should be highlighted because of its potential to serve as a model for immigrant communities worldwide.

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Introduction

Bala Traoré was 23 years old when he left Kayes to work in France. When he left Kayes, Traoré joined his friends and family in France that had also followed the long established Soninké tradition of travel and adventure.¹ While in France, he connected with his village's migrant association that helped him transition into French society and support his home village community. The migrant association allowed Bala to send money directly to his family through private remittances while also supporting his community through association development projects.² Bala's contribution endorsed the primary funding source for the region's development: Migrants.

After establishing a family in Mali, Bala Traoré returned to Mali to live and work. He now works as the treasurer for AMRK (l'Association des Migrants Retours du Kayes), an association started by Ousmane Touré that helps returned migrants reintegrate back into Malian society. AMRK began in 2006 with the support from returned migrants, GRDR (le Groupe de Recherche et de Realisations pour le Développement Rural), and CIDS (le Collectif Ingénieurs Développement Sahel). This collaboration represents the nexus of community, NGO, and government support for the concept of co-development, an idea that began as a mechanism of development, but is rapidly changing in meaning as migratory pressure increases in Europe.³

While Bala Traoré settled in Mali, the migratory flow out of Mali continues. Presently, it is estimated that four million Malians are living outside of Mali. The majority of migrants are temporarily living in neighboring West African countries for work, but the approximately 100,000 migrants residing in France are becoming a growing focus for innovative European migration control policies.⁴ As restrictive immigration policies fail to block migrations,

¹ Soninké is an ethnic group that is largely present in the Senegal River Valley (Kayes region of Mali, Mauritania, and Senegal)

² See page 15 for discussion on remittances

³ TRAORE, Bala, interview by Diane Galatowitsch. *AMRK (Association des Migrants Retour du Kayes)* (November 20, 2009).

⁴ Merabet, Omar, and Francis Gendreau. *LES QUESTIONS MIGRATOIRES AU MALI: VALEURS, SENS ET CONTRESENS*. Fonds Européen de Développement (FED), 2007.

governments are toying with more flexible control strategies that target the “roots” of immigration. Specifically, the strategy of co-development, which is a migrant led movement for community development in their countries of origin, co-development is increasingly attracting the attention of governments worldwide as a strong means of curbing migration by targeting development in the source countries. However, while governments want to capitalize on migrant co-development initiatives to control migration, the idea that migration can be controlled contradicts historical migration patterns and lacks logical basis. Furthermore, the use of the concept as migration control strategy risks discrediting a promising method of development. However, even as a mechanism for development, co-development is not a program that can easily be replicated. Therefore this paper views co-development as a phenomenon in international development, rather than a strategy or policy.

This paper seeks to define systems of co-development and contextualize the varying motives of development and migration control in Mali. To begin, Part I discusses the origin and growth of co-development as a strategy of local development initiated by migrants from the Senegal River Valley. Part II presents the actors in Mali who are implementing local development projects and discusses the sustainability of co-development. Part III presents migration between Mali and France, the problems with former and existing restrictive immigration policies, the origins of co-development as a French policy to curb migration between Mali and France, and co-development policy in Mali today. Following, Part IV tackles the problems with trusting development to solve the natural processes of migration. Ultimately, this paper challenges co-development as a strategy of migration control and promotes the concept as a phenomenon in international development that should be highlighted as a model to future immigrant communities.

Methodology

The methodology of my research is defined by the goal of the study, which was to create a case study of co-development in Mali. My research included gathering information that was scattered across the fields of history, migration, and development in the forms of scholarly articles, organizational documents, reports, and personal interviews. First, I

conducted a thorough literature review to understand the theoretical frameworks surrounding the issues of migration control and development. In order to understand the structures of co-development in Mali, I conducted semi-structured interviews with a variety of organizations in Kayes and Bamako that assist or directly implement migrant financed development projects. Finally, I used structured interviews with organizations to comprehend the perceptions and working definitions of the co-development at the government and non-government level.

More specifically, to define the system of co-development as a development strategy, I traveled to Kayes to meet with organizations directly implementing local development projects co-financed by migrant associations in France. I met with both government funded and NGO organizations that focus on local development. I conducted structured interviews with program coordinators and collected publications at GRDR, the original NGO to initiate development work with migrant associations in France. Following, I met with Autremonde, another NGO that often partners with GRDR and funnels migrant association funding to support youth solidarity through building libraries in schools, literacy, and health education projects. Additionally in Kayes, I met with AGED and CIDS, two of the government funded co-development agencies that implement local development and personal enterprise projects. At AGED I used organizational documents and development project reports to learn about specific development projects being completed in the region. Upon returning to Bamako, I was able to contextualize the work of AGED and CIDS by interviewing the Cellule Technique of the Co-developement Mali program.

In order to understand the broader issues of migration in Mali, I posed questions to all of the local development organizations I met with, in addition to visiting broader associations that specialize in migration control activities rather than development. To begin, I met with Association Duba, a youth solidarity movement focused on building education and awareness surrounding immigration. Furthermore, I met with the Association des Migrants Retours du Kayes (AMRK), an organization that focuses on the reintegration of migrants back into Mali. I also met with CIGEM (le Centre d'Information et de Gestion des Migrations) and the Ministère de l'Exterieur et l'Integration Africaine to gain a broader understanding of migration issues in Mali.

In order to understand the nexus between migration and development, I conducted an in depth literature review and conducted structured interviews. Interviews were conducted at CIGEM, AGED, CIDS, La Cellule Technique – Codéveloppement Mali, GRDR, Autremonde, and Association Duba. At each organization, I posed the following three questions in order to gain a well rounded view of co-development and where each informant’s perspective was relative to each other:

1. Quel est le rôle des migrants au Mali ?

What is the role of migrants in Mali ?

2. Comment est-ce que vous définissez le « codéveloppement » ?

How do you define codevelopment?

3. Est-ce que vous pensez que c’est possible de contrôler la migration avec le développement? Pourquoi ?

Do you think that it is possible to control migration with development? Why?

4. Quels sont les avantages pour utiliser le codéveloppement comme une stratégie pour le développement durable ?

What are the advantages of using codevelopment as a strategy for sustainable development?

5. Pourquoi est-ce que les Maliens veulent émigrer ?

Why do Malians want to emigrate?

In addition to these questions, I asked organization specific follow-up questions that helped build my understanding of the issue. Publications from all of the interviewed organizations were also used to learn more about each organization and their commitment to development and migration control. The perspectives of informants, although not directly quoted, directed my research and are contextualized throughout the paper.

While this study makes firm conclusions about co-development in Mali and its limitations in the fields of development and migration control, the research is limited in its scope due to time constraints, small sample size, and research location. First, the research

period was limited to four weeks, which limited the sample size. Thus, the small scope of the study limits the conclusions that can be drawn from my data. Lastly, considering the bilateral nature of co-development, this research is limited to Mali and lacks the French perspective. Together, while these drawbacks to my research limit the conclusions that can be made from my data, I tried to contextualize what I learned into broader theoretical frameworks to ultimately provide a useful case study of co-development in Mali.

Part I: The Origins of Co-development as a Development Strategy



In defining co-development, it is critical to reflect on the concept's origin as a development strategy. While co-development is now used as a policy to control migration, the idea originated in Mali as a means for migrants to provide aid to their home communities.⁵ The idea first began in France when migrants from the Senegal River Valley (which includes Mali's Kayes region) organized migrant associations to assist in a smoother integration into French society while pooling money together to support development projects in their home villages. These migrant associations began development work in their home communities with the assistance of NGOs focused on research and project implementation. As the connection between French migrant associations and village communities strengthened, migrants returned to Mali and built links between villages through the creation of inter-village associations. Moreover, decentralization in Mali in 1999 enabled more leadership from Malian village communities to initiate projects that can be funded by migrant associations in France. Overall, over the past few decades, migrants from the Senegal River Valley established a system that now provides the region's primary source of funding for development.

Senegal River Valley Migrants

In coordination with migration literature, non-government and government organizations agree that migration from Mali's Kayes region is greater than other regions of

⁵ Groupe Initiatives. *MOBILITÉ ET DÉVELOPPEMENT – 3e journée d'étude du GI, 24.03.2009*. Campus du Jardin Tropical: Groupe Initiatives, 2009.

Mali because of both cultural and economic reasons. The cultural and historical aspects that contributes to high levels of emigration from Kayes is largely ethnic. The Soninké ethnic group originates from the Senegal River Valley and has a long tradition of travel, commerce, and migration engrained in its customs that have been strongly influenced by the environment and colonial powers. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s there were large migrations of Soninké to France to fill the labor needs of the French. Furthermore, migration was motivated by devastating droughts between 1968 and 1980 that forced many from the region of Kayes. However, with large inflows of migrants into Europe during the 1970s, France instigated restrictive migration policies that halted the primarily circular migration patterns between France and Mali, forcing more Malians to settle permanently in France. Today, 80% of the 80,000-120,000 Malian migrants in France are from the region of Kayes and are mainly of the Soninké ethnic group. These migrants, who came during more open times in migration, now have strong communities and networks between Kayes and France. Thus, co-development has the strongest connections and therefore greatest impact in Kayes.




Figure 1. The Senegal Valley Region ⁶

Environmental conditions of the Senegal River Valley have established a historical basis of Soninké migrations. The Senegal River Valley is located at the edge of the Sahelian and Sudanese vegetation zones and is highly dependent on agriculture that is supported by rain and

⁶ Manchuelle, Francois. *Les Diasporas des Travailleurs Soninke (1848-1960): Migrants Volontaires*. Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1997. (Originally Diarra, 1969)

recession of the Senegal River and its tributaries.⁷ This dependence leaves the region highly vulnerable to desertification and drought, which are not new issues for the region and have defined a migratory way of life for the ethnic group.⁸ The Soninké long practiced alternating settlements in order to find fertile land. Groups could stay in a spot for periods ranging from three to thirty years, depending on the land and the climate.⁹

Pre-colonial trade within the region also helped create a culture of migration. During the 18th century, the Senegal River Valley was the largest producer of millet in West Africa. The Soninké specialized in trading millet and slaves with desert nomads who sold salt, livestock, and gum Arabic. Most importantly, the Soninké were at the center of the internal West African slave trade. They imported slaves from the south, used them to produce grain, and finally traded them with desert nomads.¹⁰

French colonization promoted Soninké migration out of Mali, into Senegal, and ultimately to France. At the end of the 18th century, France built the Fort of Bakel on the Senegal River. The fort became a trading post that shipped traded down the Senegal River to Saint Louis and finally to the Atlantic Ocean and France. Since the Soninké were already established as the primary traders in the region, they took advantage of the new trade partner. Moreover, they realized the inefficiency in producing in the upper Senegal River Valley, rather than closer to the Fort of Bakel. They soon found out, as Azam and Gubert state, that it was “far more efficient to migrate for the rainy season to the Bakel area, to go and grow cereals, and then more and more groundnuts, on rented land.”¹¹ The new trade in the Senegal Peanut Basin created a temporary migration system from the Soninké country, which is commonly referred to as the “Navétane” system.¹² This highly successful temporary migration process promoted a heightened status for migrants and young men who left and returned with more

⁷ Daum, Christophe. *Maliens en France*. OCDE.

⁸ Manchuelle 1997, page 24

⁹ Ibid, page 43

¹⁰ The Soninke traveled as far south as Cote d'Ivoire and Guinea to trade millet for slaves and cola nuts.

¹¹ Azam, Jean-Paul, and Flore Gubert. "Those in Kayes: The Impact of Remittances on their Recipients in Africa." 2004.

¹² Azam and Gubert 2004, page 84; Daum, *Maliens en France* n.d.

money for dowries, independence, slaves, and even political influence.¹³ Migrants became the societal model to follow because of their bravery in migrating and the riches they returned with.¹⁴ In the end, the French influence shifted the motivations for Soninké migration from economic diversification to social prestige.

The first Malian communities in France began because of the established trade connection and were promoted by WWII and industrialization. The highly efficient trading system along the Senegal River soon established new jobs for Soninké in Saint-Louis, Senegal. Many were able to obtain the job of a sailor, a “Laptot”, on steam boats that carried goods from Saint-Louis to France. Laptot jobs soon became more prestigious than Navétane field jobs, which paid less. Many Soninké aristocrats were drawn to the job of a Laptot, which offered them more economic freedom from their elders and greater prestige in their communities. Furthermore, ocean and rail shipping routes became more direct and it became easier to move from Kayes to Saint-Louis to Dakar, and finally to France.^{15, 16} Additionally, during the World War II, the French recruited Malians to fight in the French army and after the war, some decided to stay. The French also promoted temporary migration to fill the growing market for service labor in the automobile industry in Urban France.¹⁷

Aristocrats and wealthier Soninke were drawn to the temporary migration system for the prestige it brought to them and their families. Therefore, while migration was promoted for economic reasons, it was not motivated by economic necessity. As N’Diaye expressed, “prestige accrues to the one who gives, as in most other African societies, and the welfare of his clientele guarantees it.”¹⁸ Moreover, griots ensured that a good reputation was maintained, since the gifts of the migrant benefited the entire community.¹⁹

While migrants carried a high status in the Malian villages, Soninke migrants held “low-qualification jobs” and lived in immigrant hostels with poor conditions in France. Since

¹³ Manchuelle 1997, page 139

¹⁴ Ibid, page 213

¹⁵ The first Soninke migrants to France came to Bordeaux and Marseilles.

¹⁶ Azam and Gubert 2004, Manchuelle 1997

¹⁷ Findley Sally E. Mali: Seeking Opportunity Abroad. Columbia University, 2004, page 1

¹⁸ N'Diaye, B. *Les castes au Mali*. Paris and Dakar: Presence africaine, 1995. ; Azam and Gubert 2004, page 9

¹⁹ Azam and Gubert 2004, page 9

migration was temporary, most migrants saved most of their income for their return to Mali. Some migrants invested in projects in their social network in order to “ensure their dignity and their subsistence for their old days.”²⁰ The circular migration process promoted large migration that was accelerated by a large drought in the Senegal River Valley region between 1968 and 1972, which caused massive migration from the region.²¹

In response to large influxes of migrants in the late 1960s and early 1970s, France implemented a restrictive immigration policy in 1975 that ultimately stopped circular migration and promoted permanent settlement and family reunification of Malians currently living in France. Thus, permanent communities of Soninke were established in France that continues to provide a vast network of connections and income for Malian communities. Migration is still prestigious in Soninké society and youth are continuously pressured into migrating to gain wealth, prestige, and provide insurance to their family.²² According to Manchuelle, “defending the family’s pride is the main motivation behind the willingness of the migrants to cover the risks of those remaining in the village through transfers.”²³ Today, 80% of the Malian migrants in France are Soninke, which reflects the large historical and cultural factor in Malian immigration to France.²⁴

Migrant Associations in France

In the 1960s, as migration from the Senegal River Valley was at its peak, migrants from France began organizing into migrant associations. Associations were formed by migrants from specific villages in Mali and served to help the migrants integrate into French society while continuing to support their home communities. While the Malian population is only 2.45% of the foreign population of France, these associations have distinguished Malian migrants in France as “dynamic and centered around their country of origin”.²⁵ With changes in French

²⁰ Azam and Gubert 2004

²¹ TRAORE 2009, SACKO 2009, M. Diarra 2009

²² TRAORE 2009

²³ Manchuelle 1997, page 20

²⁴ FSP Codeveloppement Mali. *Migrants: Quelle place dans le developpement*. Report, FSP Codeveloppement Mali, 2005.

²⁵ Daum, *Maliens en France* n.d.

policy in 1981, the creation of associations by foreigners became easier and the number of migrant associations skyrocketed. These organizations remain the primary source of development in Kayes.

Throughout the 1970s, migrant associations became a popular way for Malian immigrants to unite in France and support their communities in Mali. The first migrant associations were started in the late 1960s in coordination with the formation of the Groupe de Recherche pour Developpement Rurale (GRDR). The development projects provided an alternative type of assistance to their village communities. Moving beyond private remittances, migrants began working with their villages to directly support communal development. In the beginning, projects were, for the most part, fully financed by the migrant associations and the projects were directly implemented between the migrant-village networks. Projects began by focusing on the construction of social infrastructure, such as health centers, schools, and water sources.²⁶

Throughout the 1980s, participation in migrant associations grew exponentially. The large growth in associations and involvement is due to France passing the the “1901 Act” on October 9, 1981. The act repealed a law from 1939 that previously prevented foreigners from having legal associations.²⁷ In 1985, the large involvement of Malian immigrants was expressed by 70% of the 15,905 Malian immigrants who were active members in their village’s migrant association.²⁸ Since the new law allowing foreigners living in France to form associations under the same conditions as French nationals passed, over 400 migrant associations from the Senegal River Valley have been formed. While organizations existed prior to the law, the legal action enabled the migrant associations to be recognized by the French government. This recognition led to greater access to government resources and support from non-government organizations.

²⁶ FSP Codeveloppement Mali 2005; DIARRA, Mamadou, interview by Diane Galatowitsch. *GRDR, Groupe de Recherche et de Realisations pour le Developpement Rurale, Coordinateur GRN* (November 12, 2009).

²⁷ Ammassari, Savina. *Migration management and development policies: maximising the benefits of international migration in west africa*. Geneva: International Labour Organization, 2006, page 28

²⁸ Daum, Maliens en France n.d.

Today, migrant associations co-finance the majority of development projects in the region of Kayes. Migrants invest in the improvement in creation of wells, water tanks, dikes, health centers, schools, latrines, pharmacies, cooperatives, cereal stocks, grain mills, post offices, transportation, and many other projects. Furthermore, the associations focus on developing stronger education and health systems through literacy classes, teacher training, and supporting health professional training.²⁹ Overall, it is estimated that about 180 million Euros are transferred from Malians in France to Kayes.³⁰

A study conducted by the FSP Codéveloppement Mali program in 2004 presents an excellent progress report for migrant associations working in the region. The research sampled 42 migrant associations that include 11,000 members, 31 villages in Mali that are in 21 communes that include 135,000. Together, the sampled migrant associations have implemented a total 250 development projects. Furthermore, the program found that education projects are the most common projects implemented by the associations, but mosques are generally their first investment in their community. According to the study, “mosques play a role of prestige and often constitute a card of entry for the legitimacy for the success of other projects”. On average, migrant associations conducted a project in their village community every five years.³¹ The study emphasized the changing role of migrants in development in their home countries. As decentralization strengthened the power of local leaders in Mali, more projects are initiated and even co-financed by Malians. Additionally, more NGOs, governments, and international organizations are beginning to support migrants. While most migrant associations funded 100% of their projects in the 1970s, partnerships (between migrant and village associations, commune associations, national governments, the European Commission, and NGOs) are increasingly sharing the cost of development while using the expertise of the migrants and village communities.³²

A prime example of migrant association development is the case of ADD (l'Association pour le Développement de Dialaka) helping fund the building of a CSCOM in the village of

²⁹ Daum, Maliens en France n.d.

³⁰ Agence France Presse 2005

³¹ Associations generally gave about 9 million FCFA for each project.

³² FSP Codeveloppement Mali 2005

Diakala. There are approximately 5,000 residents living in Diakala, a predominantly Soninke village with economic activities focused largely on agriculture and cattle. The migrant association, ADD, began in France in 1998 and currently has 200 active members. Since starting, the association has built a collective primary school, a potable water system, and a religious center (mosque). Neighboring villages within the commune of Tinga (Diakala is a part of this commune along with three other villages) have been focusing on remodeling and building health centers in each village. In 2005, there was only one health center in Marena that served all four villages. Between 2002 and 2006, the health in Marena was remodeled and an additional CSCOM was built in Lambatara. The building of the CSCOM in Dialaka was proposed to continue the pattern of increased access to health care in the commune. AGED (state whole name), which was funded by the FSP Codevelopment Mali program, co-financed the project and the CSCOM was built in conjunction with the village and commune's support.³³

Projects initiated by migrant associations, such as the Diakala CSCOM, display the power migrants play in the development of their villages of origin. As education, religious, and health centers are built throughout Kayes, migrants are building their communities and playing an increasingly important role in development.

The Growing Role of Migrants in Development

Migrants provide an unmatched source of funding for community development in Kayes. Between 2000 and 2004, the over 400 migrant associations contributed almost 3.6 billion FCFA (5.5 million Euros) for local development in Kayes.³⁴ Combining private remittances with migrant association funded development projects, migrants are the primary driver of development in the region.³⁵ Moreover, with Mali's decentralization, the expertise of returned migrants NGO and government partnerships, the role of migrants in the development of Kayes is growing.

³³ FSP Codeveloppement Mali 2005 ; SACKO, Kasse, interview by Diane Galatowitsch. *AGED, Agence Generale d'Expertise pour le Developpement* (November 13, 2009).

³⁴ FSP Codeveloppement Mali 2005

³⁵ Niamele 2009

While the defining characteristic for Malian immigrants compared to other immigrant communities is their unity and financial support for communal projects, private remittances are still important contributions from migrants that cannot be ignored. Remittances, which are coordinated through the big name money transfer agencies such as Western Union, are well-established and practiced globally by migrants to support families from a distance.³⁶ Even though remittances are private contributions, they are often cited as a strong supporter of community development. While money is being sent to private families, it is still supporting a family that can feed and provide for itself. Moreover, increasing the livelihood of one family is often seen as increasing the potential of increasing personal enterprises that can often create work and provide for the community at large.³⁷ Furthermore, the increase in migration from north to south has been coupled with an increase of global remittances. Remittances have increased from \$2 billion (US) in 1970 to (no less than) \$116 billion in 2003.³⁸ These private transfers of aid have proven “to be less volatile, less pro-cyclical, and therefore a more reliable source of income than other capital flows to developing countries, such as foreign direct investment (FDI) and development aid. Moreover, in 2001, according to Gammeltoft, 2002, remittances were “double the amount of foreign aid and 10 times higher than net private capital transfers to developing countries.”³⁹

Decentralization was cited by all of the organizations working with migrant associations and development as a turning point in their structure, programming, and mission.⁴⁰ The process of decentralization began in Mali in 1999 and can be defined as the “emergence of local government authorities” and referred to as “the cornerstone of democracy, local development and the fight against all forms of poverty.” Through local elections creating elected councils at the commune, district (cercle), and regional level, decentralization gave more power to the

³⁶ de Haas, Hein. "International Migration, Remittances and Development: Myths and Facts." *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 26, No. 8, 2005: 1269 – 1284.

³⁷ De Haas 2005

³⁸ De Haas 2005; Gammeltoft, P (2002) Remittances and other Financial Flows to Developing Countries (Copenhagen: Centre for Development Research).; World Bank (2005) Global Development Finance 2005 (Washington, DC: World Bank).

³⁹ De Haas 2005; Gammeltoft 2002

⁴⁰ M. Diarra 2009; Niambele 2009; SACKO 2009; TRAORE 2009; SIDIBE, Moussa, interview by Diane Galatowitsch. *CIDS, Collectif Ingenieurs Developpement Sahel* (November 17, 2009).

communities through the creation of local governing bodies.⁴¹ Now, communal and village governments are able to initiate development projects that their migrant association can fund from France. Furthermore, decentralization has motivated communal projects that benefit multiple villages at a time. The FSP Codevelopment Mali study found that between 2000 and 2004, 31% of projects were communal and 2 out of 3 communes had migrants that participated in financing at least one communal project.⁴² The process of decentralization has empowered migrants and their communities in creating projects of sustainable development.

Additionally, returned migrants play an increasing role in promoting cooperation and offering expertise for projects. Starting in the late 1980s, returned migrants began to form inter-village associations that helped coordinate projects that would benefit multiple villages at once. As Mamadou Diarra of GRDR stated, the inter-village associations helped one village build a school that would serve four villages and roads were built between the villages to gain access to the schools.⁴³ Even prior to decentralization, returned migrants were able to unite communities. This illustrates the rising importance that returned migrants play in their communities.

In addition to the substantial role of migrants in their communities, assisting organizations have a rising responsibility within the region as well. With growing cooperation between NGO, government, and community involvement in development, migrants are increasingly more capable of starting sustainable development in their villages of origin.

Part II: Co-development as a Local Development Strategy



Migrants from Kayes play a unique role in supporting their local communities through development projects, but external organizations are critical in providing planning, implementing, and evaluating effective and efficient projects. Currently, there are NGO and

⁴¹ SNV Mali: Diarra, Souleymane, et al. *Decentralization in Mali: Putting Policy into Practice: Bulletin 362*. Bulletin, Amsterdam: Royal Tropical Institute (Kit), 2004, page 11

⁴² FSP Codeveloppement Mali 2005

⁴³ M. Diarra 2009

government organizations capitalizing on the strengths of migrant led development. This section highlights the main organizations in Kayes: GRDR (**G**roupe de **R**echerché et de **R**ealisations pour le **D**éveloppement **R**ural) and AGED (**A**gence **G**enerale d'**E**xpertise pour le **D**eveloppement). GRDR was the first organization to collaborate with migrant associations and is well established as a trusted community resource. AGED is the Malian government funded equivalent of GRDR's PAIDEL program (**P**rogramme d'**A**ppui aux **I**nitatives de **D**eveloppement **L**ocal) that was started in 2000.⁴⁴ Both PAIDEL and AGED focus specifically on activities including consulting, planning, capacity building, and evaluating local development projects in Kayes. Both programs have established partnerships with specialized NGOs that focus directly on development projects ranging from health to food security. This paper also introduces Autremonde, an NGO focusing on youth solidarity and education that coordinates with GRDR to use migrant association co-financing. Through cooperation, credibility, and Malian ownership in development, communities are able to construct sustainable development projects through the co-development.

NGO partnerships in Kayes

While migrant associations were organized in France to support their communities in Mali, it took the partnership of NGOs to promote the actual implementation of development projects. While multiple NGOs now partner with migrant associations in implementing projects, GRDR was the first to execute codevelopment in the region and it has formed into a well respected and trusted organization that partners and guides migrant associations and other NGOs in the region in local development projects initiated or supported by migrants. An example of another NGO that has a growing presence in Kayes and partners with GRDR on several projects is Autremonde, a youth solidarity organization that supports education building development projects co-financed by migrant associations. The work of GRDR and Autremonde in Kayes represents the increasingly sustainable projects that are financed by migrants.

GRDR was formed in France in 1969 by migrants from the Senegal River Valley. The organization formed in conjunction with the creation of migrant associations representing

⁴⁴ GRDR, PAIDEL . *La Concertation Communale*. Booklet, Montreuil, France: GRDR, 2009.

Malian, Senegalese and Mauritanian immigrants. GRDR is commonly referred to as the first NGO to work with co-development and implementation of migrant initiated development projects.⁴⁵ At the forefront of development in Kayes and the integration of Malian immigrants in France, the organization's structure and programming have changed substantially in light of shifting immigration policy and development theory. GRDR works between migrant associations and villages through the development structure shown in figure 2. Ultimately, GRDR has shaped co-development into the local development strategy it is today.




Figure 2. GRDR Development Structure

Today, PAIDEL is GRDR's specific program focusing on co-development. The formation of PAIDEL in 2000 as a pilot project was in response to Mali's decentralization. Prior to PAIDEL, the larger organization of GRDR was focused on coordinating the development projects. Between 1969 and 1985, the organization's development initiatives were run directly between migrant associations and villages with projects primarily focused on building social infrastructure (schools, wells, health centers, and mosques). Starting in 1985, returned migrants started coordinating inter-village associations, which combined existing village associations in order to more efficiently meet the needs of the communities. The leadership of the returned migrants helped build the credibility and sustainability of the GRDR development work. With the beginning of Mali's decentralization in 1999, more power was given to the

⁴⁵ Ammassari 2006, page 47

migrant and village associations in developing their communities. The creation of PAIDEL supports the politics of decentralization and GRDR seeks to more effectively orient sustainable projects that are co-financed by migrant associations with the program.⁴⁶

As the local development branch of GRDR, PAIDEL coordinates projects between the migrant associations in France and the villages in Mali (via village or commune associations). PAIDEL seeks to direct sustainable development projects chosen by the population through:

- 1) Furthering and supporting local consultation between all actors (civil society and local communities)
- 2) Reinforcing the competency of local actors
- 3) Creating synergy between the policy of decentralization and local dynamics.

PAIDEL is currently in its third phase and continues to diagnose potential development opportunities, as well as plan, implement, and provide follow-up evaluation for projects. Since starting, PAIDEL's work has grown from helping 30 communes during the pilot phase to assisting 50 today.⁴⁷ PAIDEL approaches local development through the decentralized structure by understanding the commune's population and needs, consulting with elected leaders, researching financial opportunities, forging networks of development actors, organizing and planning development projects, and working with the community to execute the projects. Additionally, PAIDEL's goal is to keep the commune's population informed of the progress of the projects throughout each step.⁴⁸ PAIDEL will enter its third phase starting in 2010. PAIDEL II was funded for two years with a budget of 3 million Euros with support from donors ranging from the French government to Oxfam.⁴⁹

While GRDR's PAIDEL specializes in direct technical assistance to implementing all types of migrant association development projects, there are many NGOs that work indirectly with the associations for specific projects. GRDR helps create partnerships and networks between

⁴⁶ PAIDEL 2009, page 7

⁴⁷ PAIDEL 2009, page 6

⁴⁸ PAIDEL 2009, page 8

⁴⁹ Donors include: MIIINDS (Ministère de l'immigration, de l'intégration, de l'identité nationale et du développement solidaire), CCFD (Comité catholique contre la faim et pour le développement), CRIF (Conseil régional Ile de France), RNPDC (Région Nord-Pas-de-Calais), RC (Région Centre), UE (Union Européenne), ACF, CFSI (Comité Français de solidarité internationale), CG93, Intermon Oxfam, Secours catholique.

local NGOs that specialize in development projects demanded by the migrant associations. For example, organizations such as the Cas de la Cimade or the CCFD work directly with financial research and feasibility of projects, such as Ingenieurs sans frontières.⁵⁰ Additionally, there are organizations like Autremonde, an organization that began in France and now supports migrant association development projects that focus on education and youth solidarity. Moreover, GRDR incorporates support for personal enterprises for migrants that benefit the large community. For instance, the creation of the AMRK (Bala Traore's organization) was started with the support of GRDR and CIDS, a government and non-government partnership.⁵¹

Autremonde is an excellent example of a newer organization that often partners with GRDR and is consistently starting sustainable development projects financed by migrants in the region. The organization started in France in 1985 and opened its Mali branch in 1997. Originating in France, Autremonde worked with literacy projects in France and realized the need to focus on education in the home countries of the immigrants. The first projects in Kayes were organizing school libraries and cooperatives in villages to purchase school supplies at wholesale prices, since children couldn't afford materials.⁵² Since starting, the organization has built ten school libraries funded by migrants, which are now fully functioning and independently run within the communities. Moreover, the organization addresses the problem of Mali's weak educational system and supports students in passing exams and builds enthusiasm for learning. Autremonde is furthering its objectives by branching into health education with the partnership of GRDR at Kayes CSCOMs. The organization represents the benefits of using migrant financed projects for development. As the assistant technical director of Autremonde states, "the projects have a lot of credibility because they are initiated by the community – either directly or through migrants".⁵³ Autremonde provides an excellent example of how NGOs have capitalized on migrant financing for development in order to promote improved education in Kayes.

⁵⁰ Daum, Maliens en France n.d.

⁵¹ TRAORE 2009

⁵² Lebas, Mathias, interview by Diane Galatowitsch. *Assistant Technique, Autremonde* (November 18, 2009).

⁵³ Lebas 2009

Government Support for Co-development

The government of Mali supports co-development as a local development strategy through its program AGED. This agency was formed in 2002 after the bilateral agreement between France and Mali created the FSP (**Fond de Solidarité Prioritaire**) Codéveloppement Mali program. While the FSP withdrew from Mali because of the government's refusal to sign the immigration agreement in 2008, AGED and other funded programs are still running with the support of the Malian government and CIGEM (**C**entre d'**I**nformation et de **G**estion des **M**igrations).⁵⁴ Overall, AGED represents the Malian government's acknowledgement of the role of migrants in development in Kayes, but the organization still has a long way to go before reaching the capacity of its NGO counterpart, GRDR.⁵⁵

The office of AGED is located in Kayes and it primarily works primarily with local development in the three northernmost cercles of the region. The agency focuses on similar activities as the PAIDEL program of GRDR by being the intermediate player between the community and the migrant association. Furthermore, AGED and the Cellule Technique of the Codéveloppement Mali program work together to help determine the relevance of development projects requested by migrant association in France and helps improve the proposals by working with local villages and communes. Moreover, the agency helps communities strengthen plans for development projects requested from the village or commune level that are seeking support from their migrant financiers.

While the program lost support from the French government, the program still functions the same as when the FSP funded the program. For each development project, the program contributes 70% of the total budget and requires the remaining 30% to be co-financed by migrant associations, villages, and other donors (which includes tax collections or private contributions). For example, the migrant association in the village of Gory Gopela constructed three classrooms, latrines, and another building through AGED. The project was 70% funded by

⁵⁴ Cressan, Gilles, interview by Diane Galatowitsch. *Assistant Technique - Cellule Technique, Codeveloppement Mali* (November 25, 2009). ; Waigalo, Amadou, interview by Diane Galatowitsch. *CIGEM, Centre d'Information et de gestion des migrations: Chef Service Appuis Operationnels* (September 30, 2009).

⁵⁵ Lebas 2009

the program, 3% by the commune, 16% by the migrant association of the village, and 12% by the village.⁵⁶ Overall, AGED and Codéveloppement Mali have completed 160 projects with a total budget of almost 1.5 billion FCFA between 2004 and 2009.⁵⁷ However, while many projects are assisted by AGED, the name of AGED is less trusted than GRDR, which has helped in community development for the past 40 years.⁵⁸

Sustainability of Co-development

Co-development is a promising practice of sustainable development that mobilizes local communities, NGOs, and governments while using existing resources and promoting regional economic growth. Since the definition and feasibility of “sustainable development” is often debated in international development research and practice, this paper acknowledges the definition set in 1987 by the World Commission on Environment and Development, which states that sustainable development “implies meeting the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.” However, since this definition is left vague and sets few parameters for measuring success of sustainable development, this paper bases the measurability of co-development’s sustainability on recommendations from a World Bank report. Through contextualizing the overlooked strategy of co-development in recommendations for sustainability, this paper offers co-development’s contributions to meeting the eighth Millennium Development Goal, which is to build “global partnership for development.”⁵⁹

The World Bank report, “Can Africa claim the 21st century”, provides an extensive look into development in Africa and offers recommendations for promoting success in the region. While co-development and the general role of migrants in development go unmentioned in the document, Malian migrants have answered many of the World Bank’s calls to action in their

⁵⁶ FSP Codeveloppement Mali. *Projet d’extension de l’école de Tichy Gansoye, commune rurale de Gory Gopela, cercle de Kayes*. Report, Kayes: AGED, 2009.

⁵⁷ Codeveloppement Mali , AGED 2009

⁵⁸ Lebas 2009

⁵⁹ UN Millennium Project. *Investing in Development: A Practical Plan to Achieve the Millennium Development Goals*. Report to the Un Secretary-General, New York: Millennium Project, 2005.

projects in Kayes. As this section argues, co-development in Kayes efficiently invests in its people, empowers communities, decreases aid dependency, promotes regional development, offers adaptive development, and is more direct than most development aid.

A large conclusion of the report is that global development actors must “invest in its people”. While the document stresses the importance of focusing on women and gender equality, migrants are ignored as important actors in development. Overlooking migrants, a population that has a strong connection to local communities, is ignoring the top supplier of foreign assistance.⁶⁰

Additionally, the report recommends that development programs should “empower citizens to hold governments accountable, enable governments to respond to new demands, and enforce compliance with the economic and political rules of the game”. Co-development in Mali is accelerating decentralization in Kayes by empowering local governments to initiate quality development projects with the support of co-financers that include well-established partnerships with French migrant associations, NGOs, the Malian government, and multilateral contributors such as the European Commission.⁶¹ The partnerships of GRDR and the Malian government have held local governments and actors accountable by requiring extensive planning and evaluation that ensure successful and efficient projects.

The report also observes that while Africa has “some of the world’s strongest communities” unity in development is often weak and ineffective, but this is not true with co-development in Kayes where development is more united and adaptive. One of co-development’s main strengths is its ability to “mobilize” village communities and unify communes. Kassé Sacko promotes co-development as a development strategy by stressing that it mobilizes the community to meet the needs that arise within their communities. Moreover, co-development projects begin with proposals directly from villages, communes, or migrants in France.⁶² Since communities are empowered with deciding their community needs, projects are relevant to their unique politics and agendas.

⁶⁰ De Haas 2005

⁶¹ M. Diarra 2009

⁶² SACKO 2009

The risk of aid dependence on specific donors is decreased through co-development because the cost of development is shared between migrant associations, villages, communes, NGOs, governments, and multi-lateral organizations. The World Bank report also sites debt and dependence as pressing problems hindering successful development in Africa. For instance, while villages are “project rich” they are often “cash poor”. With private remittances and shared donors, Kayes has less potential to follow this pattern.

Lastly, foreign aid is often bilateral and passed between governments or NGOs with specific agendas.⁶³ Co-development, on the other hand, is dependent on the migrants and where they organize themselves. In the case of the Soninke migrants, foreign aid supports regional development projects in the Senegal River Valley. This regional focus builds regional partnerships in local development. GRDR, for example, works in Mali, Senegal, Mauritania, and recently started in Guinea-Bissau.

Overall, the case of co-development in Kayes, in context of sustainable development, shows how migrants from Kayes play a unique and unmatched role in supporting their local communities. The unique nature of migrant organization and presents the development situation as more of a development phenomenon than a practice of development that can be translated to other migrant communities.

Part III: The Origins of Co-development as an Immigration Policy



With the success of migrant financed projects, the method of co-development is respected as an efficient and successful form of development in Kayes. It was not until the mid-1990s that France and other European countries started to shift the meaning of “co-development” while seeking alternative answers to weak immigration policies. Since restrictive migration policies were failing, governments began seeking more flexible strategies to curb migration. Many scholars and politicians began to promote the idea of “targeting the roots of

⁶³ The World Bank. *Can Africa Claim the 21st Century?* Report, Washington, D.C.: The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and The World Bank, 2000, page 245

the problem of migration” through development. This “smart strategy” in immigration policy has now taken the form of a transformed sense of co-development in Mali.⁶⁴ Moreover, in 2002, an agreement between France and Mali officially created a *policy* of co-development. This policy includes the previously established method of migrant-led local development, but also branches into more extensive migration control strategies. While this policy has recently been suspended by Mali’s refusal to sign the immigration agreement with France in 2008, the idea of co-development as a migration control technique has not been abandoned. This section seeks to define the newly established co-development and challenge its potential as a policy of controlling emigration from Mali.

Inspiring New Solutions: Problems with Restrictive Immigration Policies

The inspiration for using co-development as a strategy for migration control came largely from the failure of more restrictive immigration policies. Immigration is a growing topic on many domestic agendas. For America, the issue of controlling the border between Mexico and the United States is constantly being discussed. Similarly, migrants are often referred to as flooding into Europe and France from Africa. While the issue is argued by many scholars as overblown, it still finds itself at the top of national agendas. Thus, it is important to discuss the problems with adopting restrictive policies in order to understand the reasons politicians are searching for new and clever ways, of controlling the situation. In this case, the reasons that co-development is a promising alternative to past initiatives.

To begin, as mentioned in the discussion of the causes for migration from the Senegal River Valley to France, the Soninke migrants from Mali were motivated to settle permanently in France because of the implementation of more restrictive immigration policies. Prior to July 3, 1974, immigrants from Mali arriving in France only needed a registration with the National Board of Immigration (ONI) and a simple Malian identity card. This system promoted circular migration. However, between January 1975 and May 1981, residence and work permits began

⁶⁴ de Haas, Hein. "Turning the tide? Why Development will not stop migration." *Development and Change*, Vol. 38 (5), 2007.

to be limited in duration (one to three year permits). The permits restricted work to the initial work allocated for the permit. Moreover, the French government set a goal of organizing and returning migrants to their countries of origin. The policy was largely in response to the oil shock and unemployment. After 1981, "privileged residence cards" that were valid for ten years started to be issued. Additionally, the French government began to cover all immigrant communities from developing countries with the objective of integrating those who were there and controlling the flow by preventing a new set of migrants.⁶⁵

Just as in France, throughout the 1990s many countries moved to a variety of restrictive measures in controlling migration. First, there has been an increase in the militarization of border patrols along the Rio Grande and the Strait of Gibraltar (and other popular crossing points). Another method has been to withhold development aid and impose sanctions against sending countries that refuse to make efforts to control migration from their country. Lastly, return and deterrent migration policies are growing in popularity.

These restrictive policies largely fail to ameliorate migration pressures, increase hostility between countries, and even promote the wrong types of migration. Just as with the Soninke migrants in France, restrictive policy stopped temporary migration. Many Soninke were temporarily working in France, but the restrictive measures motivated them to stay rather than return. Stopping circular migration inhibits immigrants from returning to their countries because they fear losing the right to re-emigrate temporarily or permanently.⁶⁶ Moreover, during the mid-1990s, in an attempt to limit immigration, France imposed additional barriers for visas in efforts to combat fraudulent family reunification, legitimate French-foreigner marriages, and refugee status. The policy was extremely disorganized and violated the rights of many immigrants. With the restrictionist policy, Police were overloaded and targeted largely the legal immigrants, such as students and businessmen. The policy caused great tension

⁶⁵ Daum, *Maliens en France* n.d.

⁶⁶ Weil, Patrick. "Towards a Coherent Policy of Co-Development." *International Migration Vol. 40 (3)*, 2002, pages 46-47 ; de Haas, *Turning the tide? Why Development will not stop migration*, 2007

between the French government, immigrant communities, and the governments of the immigrant populations.⁶⁷

The restrictive immigration policies placed a lot of distrust of the French government in Malian migrant associations. This tension added a barrier to the French desire to change to a more flexible immigration policy, especially a policy that directly used migrant associations to meet their goals.

Development Curbing Migration

“If you don’t help the third world...then you will have these poor people in our society”⁶⁸

Rasmussen was one of the first politicians to adopt the attitude of using development to curb migration in source countries. However, more recently, following the devastating events in Ceuta and Melilla in 2005, many politicians emphasized restrictive border control policies, but also emphasized the need for targeting the “root causes” of migration through increasing aid and trade with sending countries. José Manuel Barroso, the president of the European Commission stated in 2005 that “The problem of immigration, the dramatic consequences of which we are witnessing, can only be addressed effectively [...] through an ambitious and coordinated development [plan] to fight its root causes’.” Moreover, from the pan-African perspective, African Union head Alpha Oumar Konare said that “walls and prisons would not solve the problem because people are migrating because of impoverishment.”⁶⁹ These claims mark a desire a change to shift the focus of migration control from restriction to more long term strategies, such as development.

Based on the assumption that decreasing poverty will be able to curb flows of migrants out of less developed countries, Mali is a prime candidate for co-development in the sense of migration control. For instance, the human development index of Mali, the UN indicator of well-being in a nation, is 0.38, which is the fifth lowest index in the world. Additionally, 91% of

⁶⁷ Weil 2002

⁶⁸ Former Prime Minister Rasmussen of Denmark, de Haas, Turning the tide? Why Development will not stop migration, 2007

⁶⁹ de Haas, Turning the tide? Why Development will not stop migration, 2007

the population lives on less than two dollars a day and 73% lives on less than one dollar a day.⁷⁰ Moreover, with a population that is expected to double by 2030.⁷¹ Currently, development in Mali is unable to match the rapidly increasing population.

However, as many call for development in sending countries, such as Mali, as a solution to international migration, actually establishing such a policy has proven difficult. In 1994, the European Commission was prompted by the European Ministers for Development Cooperation to research the idea of using development aid to control migration.⁷² Thus, the High Level Working Group (HLWG) on Asylum and Migration was established in 1998 to explore the possibilities of a creating a more flexible *migration prevention* strategy. The HLWG was supposed to develop plans promoting cooperation between sending countries regarding foreign policy, development and trade, but the plans ultimately emphasized old migration policies.⁷³ However, governments continue to promote development as a solution to migration pressures.

Furthermore, while governments claim to be currently placing more interest in development over restrictive immigration practice, there is a discrepancy in the actual allocation of funds. For example, the European Union offered only 13% of its external aid budget of 934 million Euros to development and the majority of the budget went to “strengthening border control and mitigating irregular migration”.⁷⁴ This discrepancy supports the suspicion of lesser developed countries that the idea of development is blanketing restrictive measures.

Today, an altered form of co-development is rising as the opportunity for governments to use development as a means to curb migration. With this, the concept is changing in meaning as it turns into a term to describe a migration policy that encompasses the idea of

⁷⁰ Human Development Reports: United Nations Development Programme. <http://hdr.undp.org/en/>. Accessed 11/30/09

⁷¹ ECOWAS-SWAC *Migration*. Atlas on Regional Integration in West Africa: Population Series., 2006.

⁷² Datta, Kavita. "Transforming South–North Relations? International Migration and Development." *Geography Compass*, 2009: 108–134; de Haas, Turning the tide? Why Development will not stop migration, 2007.

⁷³ de Haas, Turning the tide? Why Development will not stop migration, 2007

⁷⁴ Russell, S., and M.S. Teitelbaum (1992) *International Migration and International Trade*. World Bank Discussion Papers No. 160, Washington D.C. World Bank; de Haas, Turning the tide? Why Development will not stop migration, 2007

using development to control migration. While co-development has more components than solely migrant initiated local development, the original concept of -development is included.

French Co-development Migration Policy

Just as the development concept of co-development was established in France by migrants from Mali and the Senegal River Valley, the migration control policy of co-development was also first defined in France. Sami Nair, as the leader of the French Inter-Ministerial Mission of Co-development and International Migration (MICOMI), wrote a report that defined co-development in terms of migration and how it is used in policy today. As Chou interprets, Nair defined co-development as “deepening of cooperation” between home and host countries. Furthermore, Nair defines that it would let countries accepting migrants control migratory flows and support “micro-projects” in the sending countries. In Nair’s model of co-development, migrants would co-finance the projects and put their knowledge gained in the country of emigration into practice in their home country. According to Mata-Codesal, Nair’s definition combines a “mixture of cooperation, migration and development that relies on the migrants as “agents of development” – with the financial and educational support of different French social actors - and that revolves around the integration of migrants in origin and the promotion of development in their regions of origin, in close partnership with countries of origin of the migrants.⁷⁵Nair’s definition of co-development was promoted in a joint reference text that was the result of the MICOMI seminar concerning co-development and migration in July 2000.⁷⁶

The late 1990s marked the planning period for co-development as an immigration policy. In 1997, a round table was held in Kayes to “strengthen and mobilize migrant associations for meeting the needs of their region of origin.”⁷⁷ 1998 marked the creation of the first French-Malian committee on migrations. Additionally, in October 1999, the Tampere

⁷⁵ Mata-Codesal 2007

⁷⁶ Chou, Meng-Hsuan. *EU and the Migration Development Nexus: What Prospects for EU-Wide Policies?* Oxford: University of Oxford, 2006; Mata-Codesal, Diana. ““CIRCULAR DEVELOPMENT”: Codevelopment for temporary migration programs.” Brighton, United Kingdom, 2007.

⁷⁷ FSP Codeveloppement Mali. *Les Migrants au coeur de la cooperation*. Pamphlet, Paris: FSP Codeveloppement Mali, 2004.

European Council convened for the first official meeting relating to migration issues and European integration. A main conclusion from the meeting was that “economically-driven” migration was a “consequence of poverty”. Moreover, the council stated that the European Union needs, “needs a comprehensive approach to migration addressing political, human rights and development issues in countries and regions of origin and transit...Partnership with third countries concerned will also be a key element for the success of such a policy, with a view to promoting co-development’.”⁷⁸ Governments present at the meeting largely agreed that to decrease migratory pressure, it is critical to target development.⁷⁹ The 1999 Treaty of Amsterdam further emphasized focus on the long term approach to using development as an immigration policy. However, the concept of co-development was only vaguely defined by the Council.⁸⁰

At the turn of the century, France changed their approach to immigration with a 1998 relaxation in immigration policy and the official start of the FSP Codéveloppement Mali program in 2002. At the time, French immigration policy led the growing debate of using “flexible” migration control strategies in Europe. In 1998, France allowed foreigners to gain a “carte de retraité”, which allows individuals who have 15 years of professional activity in France to freely circulate between their country of origin and France (deminishing the worry of being refused a visa). Furthermore, the same law allowed retirees to receive pensions and access to the French medical system even if they returned home.⁸¹ In 2000, France and Mali signed their first co-development agreement, which followed similar agreements with Senegal and Mauritania (the other countries working in the Senegal River Valley region). The official start of the French funded co-development program, FSP Codéveloppement Mali was in 2002.

The FSP Codéveloppement Mali program was a bilateral project between the French and Malian governments that recently lost French support, but is now maintained by the Malian government. The program’s first phase, which was from 2002-2005, allocated 6 million

⁷⁸ Chou, EU and the Migration Development Nexus: What Prospects for EU-Wide Policies? 2006

⁷⁹ Pastore, Ferruccio. *TRANSNATIONALISM AND CO-DEVELOPMENT: ARE THEY JUST “HOT AIR” OR ARE THEY USEFUL CONCEPTS?: OBSERVATIONS BASED ON CESPI’S RESEARCH EXPERIENCE*. Rome: Centro Studi di Politica Internazionale, 2006.

⁸⁰ Chou, EU and the Migration Development Nexus: What Prospects for EU-Wide Policies? 2006

⁸¹ Weil 2002

Euros to the FSP to “support the strategy of bilateral cooperation with the Malian diaspora in France”.⁸² The program’s second phase, which allocated another 2.5 million Euros, just ended this year and was funded between 2006 and 2009. After the second phase ended in March 2009, France did not continue financial support for the program because of Mali’s refusal to sign the immigration agreement the previous year. Following the withdrawal of France’s support for the program, the Malian government began working with CIGEM, who replaced the French government’s role in the program. Codéveloppement Mali, which is now financed by Mali and CIGEM, has a budget that is divided into meeting three objectives: supporting local development through AGED, assisting in personal enterprises of returned migrants (CIDS), and targeting the youth and next generation of migrants (GERFAC). The cellule technique in Bamako provides technical oversight for the operations between migrants in France and Malians.

Current Government Financing for Co-development

Although France withdrew FSP support for the Co-development program, the programs in Mali still function under the financing of CIGEM. The new financer for Codéveloppement Mali, CIGEM, is a pilot project started by the Malian government that has the financial support from the European Union and seeks to develop a cohesive migration policy and supports the government in developing local, national, and international policy relating to immigration and emigration. CIGEM provides three services that target potential and current migrants. First, service one focuses on educating Malians about legal emigration, the dangers of illegal immigration, and job searching assistance. Service two focuses on research and documentation and seeks to collect data for the government. Service three works with diaspora organizations and supports the Codéveloppement Mali program.⁸³ Codéveloppement Mali is currently in a one year transition period and programs and goals are being re-examined by the Malian government and CIGEM.⁸⁴

⁸² FSP Codeveloppement Mali 2004

⁸³ Coulibaly, Abdoulaye, interview by Diane Galatowitsch. *CIGEM, Centre d'Information et de gestion des migrations: Charge de Mission, Servis Accueil, Information, Orientation et Accompagnement* (November 24, 2009).

⁸⁴ CIGEM: Centre d'Information et de Gestion des Migrations n.d. ; Waigalo 2009

Even while France was the first to define and adopt a policy of co-development, the implementation of the policy was referred to as “handicapped” when it was in place.⁸⁵ According to Mata-Codesal and Muynck, the French “used the concept of codevelopment in a very narrow sense, as a measure to restrict flows and encourage “voluntary” returns.”⁸⁶ The differences between the original definition of co-development and the new migration-based definition supports this argument. The local development section of the policy is only a part of the larger strategy and the French political use of the term “co-development” draws beyond the borders of development.

Governments, including France, have begun to morph co-development to fit their specific initiatives. For instance, co-development has taken the form of “assisted return migration” rather than having a focus on development. Furthermore, as Datta states, governments have begun to threaten to cease aid to countries that refuse to cooperate on the issue of irregular migration.⁸⁷ These two actions are large contributors to why Mali refused to sign the immigration agreement with France in 2008, which ended the official co-development policy between the French and Malian governments (operated through FSP Codevelopment Mali).

Mali’s refusal to sign the agreement with France in November 2008 illustrates that the French commitment to a more “flexible” strategy of “co-development” was only covering restrictive policies working along side of it. The agreement would have allowed the repatriation of any irregular Malian immigrants living in France, but Mali refused to sign the agreement that Senegal and Mauritania previously signed. Mali wanted France to adopt a policy similar to Spain’s, which regularized immigrants currently in the country, but tightened borders. Moreover, the Malian government wanted France to open paths for legal migration, encourage family reunification, promote less costly money transfer systems, and allow greater access to the French medical system.⁸⁸

⁸⁵ Mata-Codesal 2007

⁸⁶ Mata-Codesal 2007

⁸⁷ Datta 2009; de Haas 2007

⁸⁸ O'Donnell Goldensher, Liora. *Comment faire face a la migration?* ISP, Bamako: Unpublished, SIT, 2008.

Given Mali's history of co-development and the strong NGO presence, the removal of the FSP and development assistance from Mali is not a strong motive for Mali to sign onto more restrictive measures. Also, while voluntary return programs, credit funds, training-for-return programs, and other motives for return are successfully bringing Malians back to Mali, the actions will not stop the desire to migrate, especially given the cultural background of migration in the region.⁸⁹

Part IV: Challenging the basis of Co-development as Immigration Policy



As illustrated by France's withdrawal of FSP funding for codevelopment in Mali, France is not willing to accept the long term process of development in curbing migration. Furthermore, the idea that development can control migration is made on the assumption that those migrating are migrating for economic need. However, in the case of Mali, the cultural reasons for migration are just as important as economic reasons. Additionally, since the more restrictive immigration policies were implemented in France, migration patterns have begun to change in Mali and Kayes is becoming less of an emigration hotspot than other Malian cities, such as Gao and Sikasso. This section places Mali in context of current research challenging co-development as promising migration strategy.

Who Migrates from Mali?

The most common discrediting claim to why development is not able to control migration is that the idea is based on the assumption that those emigrating are trying to escape poverty or are migrating for economic *necessity*. As previously discussed, France's Malian immigrant communities are mainly of the Soninké ethnicity and were established through long cultural traditions of migration as a means of gaining social prestige. Therefore, while Malian

⁸⁹ de Haas, Turning the tide? Why Development will not stop migration, 2007

migrants in France migrated for economic reasons, prestige was a greater pull factor than necessity.

Furthermore, development is not a short term policy that is easily measurable, which causes difficulties in the fast paced political world that is constantly changing with powers at large. The long term nature of development curbing migration is illustrated by an estimate taken for Central America, that predicts that to eliminate economic incentives to emigrate, it would take \$US 100 per person, per year, for a period of 20 to 30 years.⁹⁰ Thus, while development is necessary for community well-being, the idea of targeting the “root causes” of migration is overly optimistic as an immigration policy. As de Haas states, “the ‘stay-at-home’ aid and trade policies seem to be ‘right for the wrong reasons’.”⁹¹

Even though migration in Mali includes cultural and economic reasons, those who immigrate are not the poorest of the poor – as many development projects target. While it is a popular notion that the “hungry and desperate” have the greatest tendency to migrate, it actually takes a certain amount of wealth to afford the process.⁹² To demonstrate this idea, Böhning and Oleson state that the countries with “the lowest GNP and the highest population growth generally do not exhibit the highest rates of (trans-continental) out-migration to the Western world.”⁹³ Mali is a prime example that fits these criteria, which explains why the majority of migration from Mali is to neighboring African countries such as Cote d’Ivoire and not France.

Moreover, it is often ignored that alleviating extreme poverty will probably motivate more migration in the short term. Freedom of movement and migration is even recognized as

⁹⁰ Weintraub, S. and S. Díaz-Briquets (1994) ‘The Use of Foreign Aid for Reducing Incentives to Emigrate from Central America’, in Böhning, W.R., and M.-L. Schloeter-Paredes (eds) *Aid in Place of Migration*. Geneva, ILO: 119-150: page 147) ; de Haas, Turning the tide? Why Development will not stop migration, 2007

⁹¹ de Haas, International Migration, Remittances and Development: Myths and Facts, 2005

⁹² King, A., and B. Schneider (1991) *The First Global Revolution. A Report by the Council of Rome*. New York: Pantheon Books: pages 62-3; de Haas, Turning the tide? Why Development will not stop migration, 2007

⁹³ Böhning, W. R. (1994) ‘Helping Migrants to Stay at Home’, *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 534: 165-77; Olesen, H. (2002) ‘Migration, Return and Development: An Institutional Perspective’, *International Migration* 40(5): 125-150; de Haas, Turning the tide? Why Development will not stop migration, 2007

an indicator for development.⁹⁴ For example, improving education and increasing income widens an individual's outlook on the world and motivates opportunities abroad.

Lastly, investing in development to control migration from Mali is not an efficient target for France, given the relatively small West African population related to the North African population. Migration from West Africa is often blown out of proportion while North African countries such as Algeria and Morocco place greater migratory pressure on Europe. The issue is often glorified in politics and mass media when Africans are described as "flooding" Europe. This extreme attitude only promotes xenophobic attitudes worldwide.⁹⁵

Changing migration patterns in Mali

While migration between Kayes and France has long been the focus of Malian emigration, Sikasso and Gao are turning into migrant centers as well. Sikasso is already home to many temporary migrants who work in coffee and cocoa plantations in Cote d'Ivoire. However, Cote d'Ivoire is now changing into a stepping stone for migration to transcontinental movement to Spain. Similarly, Gao is turning into a transit path for migrants crossing the Sahara in order to avoid increasingly controlled and dangerous border controls on the Atlantic.

Cote d'Ivoire currently hosts 2.5 million Malian immigrants that primarily work on plantations. The appeal of working in Cote d'Ivoire relates to the proximity to Mali as well as the draw of the stronger CFA and more stable work. With more reliable work that pays better, Cote d'Ivoire opens more opportunities to work in the western world.

Restrictive policies are also changing the routes that migrants are taking to access Europe. This change is now making Gao a region of transit for many Sub-saharan Africans hoping to migrate to Europe. While the journey is extremely challenging, it is increasingly appealing as other borders and common access points become more unreliable.⁹⁶

⁹⁴ de Haas, Turning the tide? Why Development will not stop migration, 2007

⁹⁵ de Haas, The Myth of Invasion: The inconvenient realities of African migration to Europe. 2008

⁹⁶ Tangara, Daouda, interview by Diane Galatowitsch. *Charge de Mission* (November 23, 2009).

With changing migration patterns in Mali, the reasoning for focusing on development to control migration in the Kayes region becomes less validated. With the shifting paths for transcontinental migration, both Gao and Sikasso seem like stronger candidates for co-development programming. This supports the argument that co-development, although sustainable, has limitations. Since Kayes already had a well established system of migrant associations, the government focused co-development program was naturally and practically drawn to this region (rather than Sikasso or Gao). The creation of migrant associations with strong unity between their home communities is not a development idea that can be forced. Thus, the migrants from Kayes introduced a promising phenomenon in development that has worked between their highly unified migrant communities and home communities.

Can migration be managed?

Migration cannot be managed. The process of migration is a natural process that has defined history. While countries may impose restrictive policies and try to limit migrants, populations will find ways to move and cross borders, illegally or legally. Every informant interviewed in this study in Kayes and Bamako agreed that it is not possible to control migration. Moreover, most thought it was absurd to think that development could stop such a large issue such as migration, while considering their development strategy a smart and efficient way of implementing local projects. This research is limited to the leaders of Mali's main organizations working with co-development, but if the leadership of these organizations are not aiming to control migration, their activities and attitudes will not motivate action.

To begin, the migration "explosion" and "crisis" is often aggrandized in politics. While there is migratory pressure on Europe, migrants are not "flooding" across borders, as the mass media likes to illustrate.⁹⁷ In the context of global migrations, many argue that there has been greater periods of international migration over the 19th and 20th centuries and the spike in migration in the 1990s should not be interpreted as shocking. While there has been an increase

⁹⁷ de Haas, Turning the tide? Why Development will not stop migration 2007

in the number of migrants, the rise has “kept pace” with global population growth.⁹⁸ The changing perception of migration is most likely attributed to change from North-North (Europe to North America) and North-South (colonization) to South-North.⁹⁹

As shown with France, migration cannot be controlled with Restrictionist policies, which cause problems by forcing Western governments to regularize irregular immigrants and include laws that are very difficult to enforce. Deportations and expelling migrants from countries is very costly and challenging to coordinate without infringing on human rights.¹⁰⁰ Furthermore, countries such as France have a demand for migrant labor (in both low and high skilled labor). This was the case of the Soninke in France in 1975 that established the Malian immigrant communities that continue and grow today. Now, the network “facilitates continuing labor, family and undocumented migration over formerly closed borders.” Thus, immigration is more connected to economic growth than actual policies of immigration.¹⁰¹

Moreover, it is unrealistic to expect West African countries to have the means to “combat illegal migration”. If countries are withholding development aid as a threat to controlling migration, it is a sign that they are being unreasonable. Many of these countries do not have the capacity to enforce the laws and corruption challenges the validity of any law. As de Haas asks, “If Europeans are unable to seal off borders, how can African states be expected to do so?” Additionally, it is not in the best interests of African nations to stop migration, a phenomenon that provides millions in remittances and expertise.¹⁰²

⁹⁸ Nyberg-Sørensen, N., N. Van Hear, and P. Engberg-Pedersen (2002a) ‘The Migration-Development Nexus: Evidence and Policy Options; State-of-the-Art Overview’, *International Migration* 40(5): 3-48.: pages 6-7; de Haas, Turning the tide? Why Development will not stop migration, 2007

⁹⁹ de Haas, Turning the tide? Why Development will not stop migration, 2007

¹⁰⁰ de Haas, Hein. "The Myth of Invasion: The inconvenient realities of African migration to Europe." *Third World Quarterly*, 2008: 1305-1322.

¹⁰¹ de Haas, International Migration, Remittances and Development: Myths and Facts, 2005

¹⁰² de Haas, The Myth of Invasion: The inconvenient realities of African migration to Europe, 2008

Conclusion

Overall, this case study establishes a historical basis for migration from Kayes, contextualizes co-development in immigration and development literature, and provides insight into how those implementing migrant financed projects in Mali define and perceive the concept of co-development. Challenging the concept as an effective immigration policy and a development strategy, this paper reflects co-development's true benefits to Malian society. Finally, the conclusion is drawn that while co-development in Mali fits many credentials of sustainability, it is not a *strategy*, but rather a phenomenon of development. However, the unique role of migrants in Kayes (and the broader Senegal River Valley region) should be highlighted because of its potential to serve as a model for immigrant communities worldwide.

In conclusion, Soninké migrants from Kayes did not create co-development to control migration, but rather created a system of local development capitalizing on resources and benefits of migrating to France for social prestige and assisting their families at home. Therefore, as governments, such as France, latch on to successful migrant development initiatives in order to target the "root causes" of migration, they risk exploiting a promising practice of sustainable development. Using co-development to control migration is too long-term of a strategy for immigration policy. Moreover, governments should promote the phenomenon of migrant financed projects for the sake of development and not link funding and support to immigration policy. Thus, co-development should be embraced as a strategy of sustainable development when it arises. The case of highly mobilized Malian migrants should be further discussed in the field of international development, should other immigrant communities be inspired to follow the lead of migrant associations from the Senegal River Valley.

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